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SIN TAXES: HAVE GOVERNMENTS GONE 
TOO FAR IN THEIR EFFORTS TO 
MONETIZE MORALITY? 
Abstract: In June 2016, Philadelphia became the largest city in the United States to 
pass a soda tax, which went into effect on January 1, 2017. Soda taxes, an umbrella 
term for taxes that are assessed on sugar-sweetened beverages, represent the latest 
incarnation in a recent wave of non-traditional “sin taxes.” Sin taxes target behav-
iors that the government considers to be socially undesirable, and traditionally have 
been levied to curb consumption of alcohol and tobacco products. As state and lo-
cal governments continue to face burgeoning budget deficits, legislators have in-
creased the amount of existing sin taxes and expanded the sin tax base by taxing 
everything from sugar-sweetened beverages and junk food to disposable plastic 
bags. This Note argues that, notwithstanding the significant allure sin taxes possess 
as revenue generating tools, legislators must carefully evaluate each new potential 
“sin” independently on its own merits, and understand the inherent limitations of 
sin taxes, their regressive nature, and the attenuated public health justifications that 
accompany many non-traditional sin taxes. This Note argues that legislators should 
thus be wary of an unbridled expansion of sin taxes into non-traditional areas, and 
consider alternative methods of curbing unhealthy private behaviors, such as re-
quiring manufacturers of sinful goods and services to affix warning labels on their 
offerings and improving consumer access to healthier substitutes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2016, Philadelphia became the largest city in the United States to 
pass a tax on soda and other sugary drinks.1 The passage of the Philadelphia so-
da tax was a significant milestone because at that time, only one such proposal 
had passed in Berkeley, California, with forty other soda taxes having previously 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Michael Burke, Philadelphia Becomes First Major City to Pass Soda Tax, USA TODAY (June 
16, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/06/16/philadelphia-becomes-first-major-city-
pass-soda-tax/85999128/ [https://perma.cc/A6E7-3SZG] (noting that Philadelphia’s sugary drinks tax 
covers soda, teas, energy drinks, and sport drinks, and expressly carved out drinks containing over 
50% fruit juice, vegetable juice, or milk). In March 2013, then New York City Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg proposed to limit the size of sugary drinks sold at restaurants and theaters to sixteen ounc-
es (known as the “Portion Cap Rule”), but the proposal was struck down by the New York State Su-
preme Court as being “arbitrary and capricious.” In re N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of 
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681 (2013); see Margot Sanger-
Katz, Soda Tax Passes in Philadelphia. Advocates Ask: Who’s Next?, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/upshot/soda-tax-passes-in-philadelphia-advocates-ask-whos-
next.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4VP3-QNF7] (noting that the Philadelphia soda tax of 1.5 cents per 
ounce will apply to all sugar or artificially-sweetened drinks sold within the city limits). 
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been defeated in city and state governments across the United States.2 The Phil-
adelphia version covers sodas, sports drinks, energy drinks, and other sugary 
drinks, with the tax revenue funding early childhood education and other social 
programs.3 
The Philadelphia soda tax is one recent example of a “sin tax.”4 Sin taxes 
are a form of tax assessed on certain behaviors that the government considers to 
be detrimental to society.5 Sin taxes are uniquely powerful tools because they 
allow governments to discourage harmful individual behaviors while simultane-
ously raising revenue from them.6 Traditionally, sin taxes covered goods such as 
alcohol and tobacco products, but in recent years there has been a concerted push 
by legislators at all levels of government to broaden the application of sin taxes 
to cover new non-traditional “sins” such as sugary soft drinks and junk food.7 
The basic mechanics behind how sin taxes work are relatively straightfor-
ward: imposing a tax on a good or service makes it more expensive for consum-
ers, which in turn should lead consumers to purchase fewer of those goods and 
services.8 Because a total reduction in demand for the sinful goods and services 
to zero would be unrealistic and indeed self-defeating, governments rely on the 
fact that even after the tax has been added at least some people will still purchase 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Sanger-Katz, supra note 1. The Philadelphia soda tax was heavily contested, with the soft drink 
industry and local grocers spending nearly $5 million to lobby and advertise in opposition to the tax, 
claiming it was simply a “grocery tax.” Id. 
 3 Burke, supra note 1; see Allison Aubrey, Taxing Sugar: 5 Things to Know About Philly’s Soda 
Tax, NPR (June 9, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/06/09/481390378/taxing-sugar-5-
things-to-know-about-phillys-proposed-soda-tax [https://perma.cc/S4KD-4YXA] (highlighting that 
the soda tax in Philadelphia was originally three cents per ounce and exempted artificially sweetened 
drinks such as diet sodas). 
 4 Brian Galle, What the Soda Tax Means for Consumers, FORTUNE (July 6, 2016), http://
fortune.com/2016/07/06/philadelphia-soda-tax-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/WTX5-DACS]. Taxes on 
soda and cigarettes are different from other sales taxes because they help people avoid harming them-
selves and thus benefit the communities that pay them. Id. 
 5 Rachelle H. Perkins, Salience and Sin: Designing Taxes in the New Sin Era, 2014 BYU L. REV. 
143, 143–184; see also Richard H. Mattoon & Sarah Wetmore, Sin Taxes: The Sobering Fiscal Reali-
ty, 339 CHI. FED. RES. LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.), 2015, https://www.chicago
fed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2015/339 [https://perma.cc/5N9B-FUES] (noting that sin taxes 
both discourage individuals from engaging in socially disfavored behaviors and reimburse the public 
for the costs arising from those behaviors). 
 6 Jonathan Cummings, Obesity and Unhealthy Consumption: The Public-Policy Case for Placing 
a Federal Sin Tax on Sugary Beverages, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 273, 280 (2010); James R. Hines Jr., 
Taxing Consumption and Other Sins, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2007, at 49, 50; Vann R. Newkirk II, 
UK’s Sugar Tax: Do ‘Sin Taxes’ Work? The Wages of Sin Taxes, ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2016), http://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/the-wages-of-sin-taxes/474327/ [https://perma.
cc/MRH5-XEES]. 
 7 Perkins, supra note 5, at 145. In recent years, some lawmakers have even pushed for widening 
the definition of sin taxes to include taxing indoor tanning and strip clubs. Id. Lawmakers have also 
taken aim at goods whose consumption harm the environment, such as disposable paper and plastic 
bags. Id. at 146. 
 8 Newkirk, supra note 6. 
2018] Monetizing Morality: The New Wave of Sin Taxes 765 
the sinful goods and services.9 The key to sin taxes is that the goods and services 
usually targeted by governments to be taxed as sins are demand inelastic, mean-
ing that in theory, even modest sin taxes should generate considerable revenue.10 
Despite their tantalizing potential to raise substantial revenue for cash-
strapped governments, sin taxes come at a cost.11 For starters, sin taxes tend to 
be regressive, hitting the poorest members of society the hardest and effectively 
penalizing lower income individuals for their unhealthy consumption choices, 
which are often dictated by their cost-sensitivity and a lack of access to viable 
healthier alternatives.12 Sin taxes have also been criticized on the grounds that 
they fuel wasteful spending wars on lobbying and advertising on both sides of 
the tax.13 In some cases, even after the sin tax is passed, a portion of the revenue 
may be diverted from its originally billed purpose and instead used to fund other 
unadvertised programs.14 Sin taxes may also produce negative unintended con-
                                                                                                                           
 9 See id. (noting that some people will still consume sinful goods and services even after such 
good and services are taxed). If consumption of a good or service were entirely eliminated, there 
would not be any sales transactions remaining to be taxed and the government would be unable to 
raise any revenue. Id.; see also Catherine Rampell, For Cash-Strapped States, Sin Is Sure Lucrative, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/weekinreview/18rampell.html 
[https://perma.cc/GV4W-AJ2X] (noting that if a sin tax caused all consumers to stop their consump-
tion immediately, it would lead to withdrawal and eliminate a revenue source on which states have 
come to depend). 
 10 See Perkins, supra note 5 (noting that consumer demand for inelastic goods and services will not 
change as much as an elastic good or service and thus tends to be more efficient). Price elasticity 
measures how sensitive demand is to a particular price change; inelastic goods and services enjoy de-
mand changes that outweigh the price changes. Tatiana Andreyeva et al., The Impact of Food Prices on 
Consumption: A Systematic Review of Research on the Price Elasticity of Demand for Food, 100 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 216, 216 (2010); Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Price Elasticity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 21, 
2015), https://hbr.org/2015/08/a-refresher-on-price-elasticity [https://perma.cc/RB83-79AK]. 
 11 See Adam J. Hoffer et al., ‘Sin Tax’ Costs Outweigh Benefits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 
5, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/02/05/sin-tax-costs-
outweigh-benefits [https://perma.cc/EKW3-54ZK] (arguing that the costs associated with sin taxes in 
the form of regressivity, wasteful lobbying, and misdirected tax revenues may be on net more harmful 
than beneficial to society); Newkirk, supra note 6 (highlighting that sin taxes impose a special burden 
on the poor, who consume more sinful goods and services than the wealthy). 
 12 See Adam J. Hoffer et al., Sin Taxes: Size, Growth, and Creation of the Sindustry 1, 14 (Merca-
tus Ctr., Working Paper No. 13-04, 2013) (noting that while sales taxes are generally regressive, sin 
taxes on the consumption of goods like cigarettes and alcohol are especially regressive because the 
poor tend to consume such goods in greater amounts compared to higher income individuals). 
 13 Hoffer, supra note 11. In 2009, the soft drink industry spent over $57 million on lobbying ef-
forts in order to combat taxes on their products. Id.; see also Sanger-Katz, supra note 1 (stating that to 
combat the $5 million the soft drink industry spent in opposition to the tax, advocates for the Phila-
delphia sin tax spent about $2 million, $1.6 million of which was donated by former New York City 
Mayor Michael Blomberg). 
 14 JEAN-FRANÇOIS MINARDI & FRANCIS POULIOT, THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF TAXES 
ON TOBACCO, ALCOHOL AND GAMBLING 2 (2014); Claudia Vargas et al., Big Chunk of Soda Tax 
Money Not Going to Pre-K, INQUIRER (Phila.) (July 16, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/
news/20160614_Drink_tax_proposal_had_some_sweetners.html [https://perma.cc/2M6Z-ZTPZ]. 
Despite the fact that the Philadelphia soda tax was sold to the public as being necessary for funding 
universal pre-kindergarten, nearly 20% of the soda tax revenue (approximately $16 million of the $91 
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sequences, particularly if the sin tax is quite large, as consumers may try to avoid 
paying the tax, creating a black market for those goods and services.15 
Even on the benefits side of the equation, as legislators push to expand the 
sin tax base to cover soda and other socially disfavored goods and services, it is 
at best uncertain whether soda taxes and other non-traditional sin taxes have the 
same public health benefits commonly attributed to “traditional” sin taxes.16 
While traditional sin taxes on alcohol and tobacco products compensate the pub-
lic for negative externalities like drunk driving and carcinogenic second-hand 
smoke, the negative externalities associated with the consumption of sugary 
drinks, for example, are far less clear.17 This is in large part due to the relative 
youth of these taxes and the complexities with linking sugar intake from soft 
drinks to obesity, a condition that can be affected by many other factors aside 
from diet, such as fitness, environment, and genetics.18 It has been argued that 
non-traditional sugary drinks and junk food taxes are justified because their con-
sumption is a public health burden that drives up the costs of healthcare for eve-
ryone, but this argument could also justify taxing any behaviors which burden 
the healthcare system, such as keeping terminally ill patients on indefinite life 
support.19 
This Note argues that state and local governments looking to raise funds 
through expanding the sin tax base into non-traditional areas like sugary drinks 
and junk food must treat these taxes as different in kind to traditional sin taxes on 
alcohol and tobacco, and resist the strong temptation to use sin taxes as a mere 
proxy to regulate the consumption of any socially disfavored good or service.20 
Part I of this Note provides a historical overview of sin taxes from their origins 
during the Revolutionary War to the present day, and explores the key features of 
sin taxes which have made them an increasingly used and relied-upon tool for 
                                                                                                                           
million that the Philadelphia soda tax would generate per year) will be used to help fund other pro-
grams such as employee benefits, homelessness, and the city’s community college. Vargas, supra. 
 15 MINARDI & POULIOT, supra note 14, at 3. In Canada, a large increase in the 1990s on cigarette 
taxes caused the share of cigarettes purchased on the black market to skyrocket from 1% to 31% with-
in six years. Id. 
 16 See Newkirk, supra note 6 (noting that in the absence of clear individual or public health bene-
fits, non-traditional sin taxes like sugar taxes are primarily justified on their ability to raise revenue). 
 17 See id. (showing a direct link between soda taxes and decreases in obesity is difficult because 
soda taxes have only been in effect for a few years and obesity can be caused by multiple factors other 
than diet, including fitness, genetics, and the individual’s environment). For example, studies con-
ducted by the Mexican government and researchers in the United States show that in Mexico, which 
was one of the earliest adopters of a one peso per liter soda tax, it remains too early to tell if the tax 
has cut diabetes and obesity rates, despite a drop-off in soda sales. Margot Sanger-Katz, Yes, Soda 
Taxes Seem to Cut Soda Drinking, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
10/13/upshot/yes-soda-taxes-seem-to-cut-soda-drinking.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FD3M-YUJ8]. 
 18 Newkirk, supra note 6. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See infra notes 1–180 and accompanying text. 
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lawmakers.21 Part I also outlines the primary justifications which have been ad-
vanced for taxing sin and concludes with a discussion on the recent efforts by 
legislators to expand the reach of sin taxes to cover non-traditional items like 
sugary soft drinks and junk food.22 Part II discusses the limitations of sin taxes 
and the inherent tension between its twin aims of raising revenue and curbing 
undesirable consumer behavior.23 Part II also lays out the principal negative con-
sequences associated with sin taxes and sets forth a few alternatives to sin taxes 
as a means of nudging individuals to make healthier lifestyle choices, including 
direct regulation of sinful goods and services and enhanced labeling require-
ments for sinful goods and services.24 Part III analyzes the ways in which sin 
taxes may be reformed to both accentuate its positive impacts and reduce some 
of its negative consequences, and evaluates the merits of several proposed alter-
natives to sin taxes.25 Part III argues that legislators seeking to expand sin taxes 
into non-traditional areas in order to promote public health should treat them as 
different in kind to traditional sins and proposes a hybrid solution which, among 
other things, would couple modestly set sin taxes with mandatory labeling re-
quirements to provide consumers with better information about the health risks 
which may arise from their purchase decisions.26 
I. THE BIRTH AND RISE OF THE “SINDUSTRY” 
Sin taxes are aimed at goods and services whose consumption produces 
harmful societal side effects.27 Thus, sin taxes are often justified on the grounds 
that they discourage behaviors that impose negative spillover costs on third par-
ties.28 Section A of this Part briefly examines the history and evolution of sin 
taxes, from their inception during the American Revolution to the present day.29 
Section B highlights some of the unique features of sin taxes compared to other 
forms of taxation that make them such an attractive and increasingly used tool 
for lawmakers seeking to raise revenue.30 Section C presents the three main jus-
tifications for sin taxes including their ability to raise revenue, their potential to 
enhance private health outcomes, and their ability to promote social welfare by 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See infra notes 27–98 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 27–98 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 99–159 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 99–159 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 160–180 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 160–180 and accompanying text. 
 27 See Hoffer, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that historically goods such as tobacco, alcohol, salt, 
stamps, tea, and motor fuels have all been subject to excise taxes). 
 28 See id. at 3 (explaining that the social welfare justification for sin taxes is essentially a market 
correction mechanism because without the sin tax consumers will likely consume above the socially 
optimal quantity of the sinful good or service). 
 29 See infra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 39–48 and accompanying text. 
768 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:763 
reducing the negative externalities attendant with sinful consumption patterns.31 
Finally, Section D discusses the recent trend towards an expansion of sin taxes, 
in which legislators are adding to a growing list of sins, which to date has in-
cluded items ranging from soda and plastic bags to indoor tanning services.32 
A. The History of Sin Taxes 
One of the earliest sin taxes in the United States was an excise tax passed in 
1791 on the sale of domestically produced whiskey and other alcoholic spirits, a 
measure proposed by Alexander Hamilton as a way to repay the national debt in 
the wake of the Revolutionary War.33 Hamilton, then President George Washing-
ton’s Secretary of the Treasury, believed that in addition to generating revenue, 
the whiskey tax would help warn the public about the negative effects associated 
with consuming alcohol.34 
Since that time, taxes on alcohol have continued to play a significant role in 
raising revenue for the government.35 Prior to the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment in 1913, which granted Congress the power to impose a federal in-
come tax, excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco represented the government’s 
primary source of revenue.36 In fact, the lost tax revenue during the Great De-
                                                                                                                           
 31 See infra notes 49–90 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 33 Perkins, supra note 5, at 149–50. The tax was assessed on whiskey and other alcoholic spirits 
produced in the United States and ultimately led to violent protests that culminated in the Whiskey Re-
bellion of 1791. Id. at 107–08; Michael Hoover, The Whiskey Rebellion, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, https://www.ttb.gov/public_info/whisky_
rebellion.shtml [https://perma.cc/DD8J-5MBH]. The tax, known as the Distilled Spirits Tax of 1791, was 
calculated on a per gallon basis and was paid, in cash, by whiskey and other alcohol spirit producers 
directly to the U.S. government. Hoover, supra. 
 34 Perkins, supra note 5, at 149–50; see also Newkirk, supra note 6 (noting that The Sugar Act of 
1764, though not intended to be a sin tax, had the effect of one by simultaneously raising revenue for 
the British Crown while also discouraging alcohol consumption by making sugar, a key input in the 
production of rum, more expensive than before). 
 35 Perkins, supra note 5, at 150. In 1862, an alcohol tax was passed to raise revenue to help fund 
the Civil War effort and remained in effect even during Prohibition. Id. 
 36 Id. The Sixteenth Amendment provided that “[t]he Congress shall have power to lay and col-
lect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. An excise tax is 
a tax that is due at the time a specific good or service is purchased and is commonly built into the 
price of the good or service. Excise Tax, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/excise-tax [https://perma.cc/4HTW-JPSG] (last updated Nov. 20, 2017); see Phineas 
Baxandall, Taxing Habits: When It Comes to State Taxes, Sin Is In, FED. RES. BANK BOS. REGIONAL 
REV., Q1 2003, at 19, 24 (noting that in 1910, revenue generated from alcohol and tobacco taxes com-
prised 37% of the federal budget). Early federal excise taxes targeted goods such as tobacco and re-
fined sugar, but faced intense opposition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, today, are 
much less important sources of revenue than they once were. Hines, supra note 6, at 51–52. Indeed, 
all federal excise taxes were eliminated at various points in time, and since the passage of the Six-
teenth Amendment in 1913, the federal income tax quickly replaced federal excise taxes as the prima-
ry source of the federal government’s revenue. Id. at 52. Nevertheless, some federal excise taxes still 
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pression as a result of Prohibition proved to be a key factor in the government’s 
decision to ultimately repeal Prohibition years later, underscoring the importance 
of tax revenue collected from taxes on alcohol.37 
According to figures published by the U.S. Census Bureau, excise taxes on 
alcohol and tobacco products still remain crucial sources of revenue for the gov-
ernment, with total state receipts for sales of alcoholic beverages in 2015 totaling 
$6.43 billion, and state sales of tobacco products nationwide accounting for over 
$17.7 billion in tax revenue over the same period.38 
B. Sin Taxes as Attractive Political Tools 
Sin taxes are particularly attractive to lawmakers because they are relatively 
easy to pass and later amend, if necessary.39 One unique feature of sin taxes is 
that they typically face fewer political opponents compared to general taxes be-
cause they only apply to those who actually purchase the sinful good or service, 
making them more likely to be passed into law.40 Furthermore, resistance to sin 
taxes also tends to be less robust because sin taxes are intended to operate, at 
least in part, for the good of society by reducing the quantity of some defined 
social harm, such as secondhand smoke in the case of cigarette taxes or drunk 
driving in the case of alcohol taxes.41 Moreover, because sin taxes are already 
reflected in the prices of the disfavored goods and services at the time of pur-
chase and not assessed separately after the fact, they are less visible and obvious 
to consumers than other taxes, such as property or income taxes.42 
                                                                                                                           
exist today, with the most prominent perhaps being the federal gasoline tax, which was passed in 1933 
as part of an effort to reduce traffic congestion and pollution. Id. 
 37 Perkins, supra note 5, at 150. After Prohibition was repealed in 1933, federal excise taxes ac-
counted for around 15% of federal revenue with revenue from the federal alcohol tax totaling $500–
600 million per year. Hines, supra note 6, at 52. 
 38 2015 State Government Tax Collections, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/YG6T-QCFN]. By way 
of comparison, in 2015, state income tax receipts totaled over $387.2 billion and total tax revenues 
approximately $916.5 billion. Id. 
 39 Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5; Perkins, supra note 5, at 152; see Eduardo Porter, A Tax 
Code of Politics, Not Reason, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/
business/economy/a-tax-code-of-politics-not-practicality.html [https://perma.cc/B4BG-EKLW] (not-
ing that income taxes are less effective at raising revenue than other taxes for political reasons). In-
come taxes split Democrats and Republicans with Democrats generally in favor of taxing wealthier 
Americans to fund public programs for the poor and Republicans preferring to use tax exemptions and 
deductions to help wealthy Americans avoid the full brunt of the income tax. Porter, supra. 
 40 Perkins, supra note 5, at 153. Sin taxes affect fewer individuals than an income tax, for exam-
ple, because not everyone smokes or drinks alcohol. See id. (discussing, in general, the applicability of 
sin taxes to only select portions of the population). 
 41 See id. (noting that sin taxes are intended to advance some social benefit). 
 42 Baxandall, supra note 36, at 26. While sin taxes have a long tradition in the United States, 
today’s sin taxes are accompanied by a host of problems, including regressivity and problems stem-
ming from their inability to distinguish between responsible and irresponsible consumption behaviors. 
Id. at 19. See generally Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. 
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Taxing consumption is also far simpler than collecting income taxes be-
cause consumption taxes are levied at the point of sale and are entirely inde-
pendent of an individual’s income level.43 Perhaps just as important, consump-
tion taxes are not only easier to collect, but are also more difficult to evade.44 
Further, sin taxes do not create perverse incentives like other forms of taxation, 
such as income taxes which can penalize desirable activities such as working.45 
Because taxing an activity generally reduces the quantity of that activity, an in-
crease in income taxes for example would operate to discourage working and 
thus distort decision-making in a way that tends to hurt the economy.46 In con-
trast to sin taxes, general taxes have faced widespread voter backlash, as evi-
denced both by the outcomes of specific referenda and the lack of popular sup-
port for the legislators who propose them come re-election.47 Finally, because 
consumption of a sinful good or service is not essential, sin taxes are viewed as 
“voluntary user fees,” which lends sin taxes an appearance of fairness that is 
lacking amongst other common forms of taxation.48 
                                                                                                                           
REV. 1145 (2009) (describing “tax salience” as how visible the tax is when built into the price of a 
good or service and noting that when taxes are built into a price, it may help obscure the actual tax 
rate). Studies have shown that taxpayers are more likely to ignore the after-tax price of a good and 
focus on the pre-tax price in situations where tax salience is lower. Jacob Goldin, Optimal Tax Sali-
ence, 131 J. PUB. ECON. 115, 115 (2015); Perkins, supra note 5, at 144. 
 43 Porter, supra note 39. Consumption taxes are commonly observed in Western Europe where 
several nations believe that all citizens have a right to enjoy a minimum income. Id. 
 44 Id. Consumption taxes also create fewer perverse incentives with respect to the quantity of 
work or investment an individual undertakes in response to the tax. Id. Some scholars believe that 
consumer taxes also independently benefit society by encouraging savings and thereby helping to 
promote economic growth. Id. Consumption taxes are also harder to evade than income taxes and thus 
should have a more robust revenue stream. See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Psychic Cost of Tax 
Evasion, 56 B.C. L. REV. 617, 618 (2015) (noting that a major problem with income taxes is that 
people cheat on their returns, in part because only about 1% of individual taxpayers are audited and 
the penalties for underreporting are also relatively small). 
 45 Porter, supra note 39. 
 46 See Martin Feldstein, Effects of Taxes on Economic Behavior, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 131, 134, 137 
(2008) (suggesting that changes in the income tax rate not only affect labor supply, but also taxpayers’ 
consumption levels); N. Gregory Mankiw, I Can Afford Higher Taxes. But They’ll Make Me Work 
Less, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/business/economy/10view.
html [https://perma.cc/FS5P-ZSU3] (implying that tax increases would diminish incentives to keep 
working because the marginal return to labor would be correspondingly decreased); see also Megan 
McArdle, Why States Like Sin Taxes, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/
view/articles/2015-01-23/what-states-get-out-of-sin-taxes [https://perma.cc/WJ4D-WXKT] (noting 
that consumption taxes raise the price of current and future consumption equally, and thus do not 
distort decisions on when to engage in the taxed behavior). Revenue generated from income taxes can 
also be extremely inconsistent, fluctuating with individual employment changes, whereas sin tax rev-
enue tends to be more steady and reliable. McArdle, supra. 
 47 Perkins, supra note 5, at 152–53; Sandra Fabry, Reliance on ‘Sin’ Taxes Draws Opposition, 
HEARTLAND INST. (June 1, 2005), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/reliance-on-sin-
taxes-draws-opposition?source=policybot [https://perma.cc/S9HK-Q5WJ]. 
 48 See Baxandall, supra note 36, at 26 (suggesting one reason for the relative popularity of using 
sin taxes to raise revenue is because the public views them as voluntary user fees). To borrow a quote 
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C. Justifications for Sin Taxes 
The main justifications advanced in support of sin taxes include their ability 
to raise revenue, advance private health outcomes by discouraging individual 
consumption of sinful goods and services, and promote public health by com-
pensating society for the costs of sinful consumption.49 Subsection 1 of this Sec-
tion details the revenue-raising justification for sin taxes.50 Subsection 2 discuss-
es the way sin taxes operate to nudge individuals towards making healthier life-
style choices for themselves by raising the cost of purchasing sinful goods and 
services.51 Finally, Subsection 3 explains the public health and social welfare 
arguments that are made in favor of instituting sin taxes.52 
1. Sin Taxes Are Effective Revenue-Raising Instruments 
Perhaps the least controversial justification for sin taxes is that they are ex-
tremely effective tools for raising revenue for governments.53 According to one 
estimate, the United States collects over $96.2 billion per year from state and 
federal gambling, tobacco, and alcohol taxes alone.54 The revenue-raising suc-
cesses enjoyed by this triumvirate of traditional sin taxes have not gone unno-
ticed by cash-strapped governments desperate to balance their budgets.55 
Sin taxes are such effective revenue raisers because the goods and services 
they target are all relatively demand inelastic, which means that consumers are 
relatively insensitive to price changes and will therefore purchase about the same 
quantity of the good or service as before the sin tax.56 In theory, this means that, 
provided the government has properly selected the good or service to impose the 
sin tax on, consumers will purchase about the same quantity of the good or ser-
vice, even though the price of that good or service is now higher due to the tax.57 
                                                                                                                           
from Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the finance minister of Louis XIV, sin taxes are effective because they 
“pluck the most feathers from a goose while producing the least hissing.” Id. 
 49 Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5. 
 50 See infra notes 53–60 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 61–72 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 73–90 and accompanying text. 
 53 See Jordan E. Otero, Banking on Sin: States Profit as Taxes Rise on Vice, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 26, 
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/26/banking-on-sin-states-profit-as-taxes-rise-on-
vice/ [https://perma.cc/662H-Z4HK] (noting that governments lean heavily on sin tax revenue). 
 54 Id. Of the $96.2 billion in state and federal tax receipts, gambling accounted for $24.9 billion, 
tobacco $44.3 billion, and alcohol $27 billion. Id. 
 55 Perkins, supra note 5, at 152. 
 56 Adam Hoffer et al., Regressive Effects: Causes and Consequences of Selective Consumption 
Taxation 1, 8, 9 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2015). While purchases of any good will decrease in 
response to a price increase of that good, the effectiveness of the tax also depends on the ability of 
consumers to find available substitutes for the taxed good. Id. at 8. 
 57 Perkins, supra note 5, at 173. In addition, taxes on inelastic goods have the added benefit of 
being more economically efficient because they create less deadweight loss (a measure of societal 
welfare) than taxes on demand-elastic goods. Id. at 174. 
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Indeed, numerous states have noticed the relative indifference consumers 
have when it comes to sinful consumption and responded accordingly by adopt-
ing a two-pronged strategy to increase revenue: raising the tax rate on existing 
sin taxes and simultaneously adding to a growing list of goods and services to be 
taxed as sins.58 Legislators are even considering legalizing products or activities 
that they have previously prohibited in order to enlarge the sin tax base, with 
proposals to legalize gambling and marijuana being considered in several 
states.59 In Colorado, for instance, where recreational marijuana is legal, revenue 
from taxing marijuana sales has grown dramatically each year, from $56 million 
in 2014 and $113 million in 2015 to $140 million in 2016.60 
2. Sin Taxes Improve Private Health Outcomes 
In addition to enlarging the public treasury, advocates emphasize sin taxes’ 
ability to promote private health outcomes by decreasing consumption of sinful 
goods and services on an individual basis.61 Because sin taxes force taxpayers to 
account for both the private and social costs of their behavior prior to their pur-
chase decision, sin taxes have the potential to reduce the overall aggregate level 
of sinful consumption to a more socially optimal level.62 
Sin taxes are able to accomplish this because they are a form of Pigovian 
tax, a tax that is designed to help individuals account for, or internalize, the nega-
tive side effects their personal consumption habits impose upon other members 
of society.63 A properly designed Pigovian tax imposes a tax with a value cali-
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. at 153. Most of the new sin taxes being considered are on unhealthy consumption choices 
such as drinking soda and indoor tanning, the latter of which is subject to a 10% federal tax under the 
Affordable Care Act, but eco-taxes on plastic bags and bottled water are also gaining steam. Id. at 
153–54. 
 59 JOSEPH HENCHMAN & MORGAN SCARBORO, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND TAXES: LES-
SONS FOR OTHER STATES FROM COLORADO AND WASHINGTON 2 (2016); Perkins, supra note 5, at 
156; see also Dana Radcliffe, Should States Raise Revenues by Expanding Legal Gambling?, HUFF-
INGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dana-radcliffe/should-states-raise-
reven_b_942118.html [https://perma.cc/53K8-BTH4] (noting a proposal in New York which would 
convert the state’s racetrack casinos into full-fledged casinos with table games in addition to the cur-
rent electronic slot machine offerings). 
 60 HENCHMAN & SCARBORO, supra note 59, at 4. 
 61 Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5. Some scholars argue that decreasing consumption of sins 
and compensating society for the costs of such sinful consumption have been the primary justifica-
tions for imposing sin taxes since colonial times. Id.; see Hoffer, supra note 12, at 4–5 (noting that 
today, sin taxes are more frequently defended as helping individuals avoid harming themselves 
through their consumption decisions rather than on public health grounds). 
 62 Perkins, supra note 5, at 157. 
 63 Id.; see Robert H. Frank, Heads You Win. Tails, You Win, Too., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/business/pigovian-taxes-may-offer-economic-hope.html [https://
perma.cc/WSW4-Q8L6] (noting that Pigovian taxes were named for Arthur C. Pigou, a British econ-
omist known for his 1920 book The Economics of Welfare). 
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brated to reflect the social cost of that behavior.64 With the addition of a Pigovian 
tax, the consumer is forced to internalize that additional social cost when making 
their purchase decision, as the price now reflects the sum of both the private and 
social cost of their behavior.65 Without the Pigovian tax, individuals would only 
consider the smaller, private cost to themselves of their own behavior, which 
would skew their decision-making and lead to a quantity of consumption that 
exceeds the socially optimal level for that good or service.66 Therefore, with the 
social cost transformed into a tax, the quantity of consumption is shifted to a 
more economically efficient level.67 
Taking tobacco taxes as an example, a 10% increase in the cigarette tax has 
been found to cause a 3% reduction in tobacco use, which reflects both a de-
crease in tobacco use amongst existing smokers and fewer new smokers.68 In the 
context of soda taxes, a 2016 study published in the American Journal of Public 
Health found that consumption of sugary drinks fell by around 20% in Berkeley 
neighborhoods after its soda tax was passed, and increased in San Francisco, 
which did not have a soda tax at the time of the study.69 The results square with 
the findings of a joint study published in The BMJ (formerly the British Medical 
Journal) by the Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública and the University of North 
Carolina, which analyzed the effect of Mexico’s soda tax after its passage.70 In 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Perkins, supra note 5, at 157; Pigouvian Taxes, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 19, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/economics-brief/21726709-what-do-when-interests-individuals-
and-society-do-not-coincide-fourth [https://perma.cc/64GV-NYV7]. Other examples of Pigouvian 
taxes include a tax in France on noisy aircraft at airports, and carbon taxes, which have been passed in 
Denmark, Finland, Mexico, and Chile. Pigouvian Taxes, supra. 
 65 See Frank, supra note 63 (illustrating the operation of a Pigovian tax in the context of a car 
purchase). When choosing between two cars to buy, the heavier of the two cars should be subject to a 
higher tax so that the individual purchaser is forced to account for the greater social costs associated 
with the heavier vehicle’s more damaging environmental impact and wear and tear on the roads when 
making their final decision. Id. 
 66 See id. (noting that Pigovian taxes make everyone better off by not only raising revenue for 
public programs but also reducing negative externalities). 
 67 Perkins, supra note 5, at 157; see Pigouvian Taxes, supra note 64 (noting that the main prob-
lem with relying on prices and markets to curb bad behavior is that the prices in the real world fail to 
build in the social costs). 
 68 Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5; see also Baxandall, supra note 36, at 20 (noting that studies 
show that increasing the price of a cigarette by 10% is correlated with a decrease of 3–5% in smoking, 
with cigarette taxes being especially effective with respect to teenagers who have less income and are 
more price sensitive). 
 69 Dan Charles, Berkeley’s Soda Tax Appears to Cut Consumption of Sugary Drinks, NPR (Aug. 
23, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/08/23/491104093/berkeleys-soda-tax-appears-to-
cut-consumption-of-sugary-drinks [https://perma.cc/8ZWP-397D]. Berkeley residents also reported 
drinking more water as a result of their decreased soda consumption. Id. 
 70 M. Arantxa Colchero et al., Beverage Purchases from Stores in Mexico Under the Excise Tax 
on Sugar Sweetened Beverages: Observational Study, 352 BMJ (ONLINE RESEARCH REPORT) 5 
(2016), http://www.bmj.com/content/352/bmj.h6704 [https://perma.cc/T8PE-5HC7]. The study sought 
to determine the effect on beverage purchases in Mexico’s stores a year after the tax on sugar-
sweetened beverages was instituted. Id. at 1. 
774 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:763 
that study, researchers found that since the tax was passed in 2013, sales of soda 
were down twelve percent by the end of 2014.71 The authors of the Mexican so-
da tax study did note, however, that notwithstanding the apparent correlation 
between the implementation of the soda tax and the fall in consumption of sugar-
sweetened beverages, they were unable to establish that the tax had caused the 
decline in consumption.72 
3. Sin Taxes Help Consumers Internalize Negative Externalities Associated 
with Their Consumption 
Finally, supporters of sin taxes also point to the ability of sin taxes to ad-
vance public health by decreasing not only sinful consumption, but also the neg-
ative side effects associated with it.73 Economists generally agree that govern-
ment intervention is justified whenever there is an inefficient quantity of either 
production or consumption, known as a “market failure.”74 Specifically, in the 
context of sin taxes, the market failure takes the form of overconsumption of 
sinful goods and services, which is the direct result of consumers who make their 
purchase decisions without having to account for the cost of their consumption 
to society.75 These social costs, also referred to as negative externalities, take 
many forms: for instance, consuming alcohol increases the risk of drunk driving 
and domestic violence; smoking tobacco products creates secondhand smoke, 
which is both a carcinogen and an allergen.76 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. at 5. The reduction was largest amongst poorer households with their purchases of sugar-
sweetened beverages down by 17.4% by December 2014 and overall purchases of beverages that were 
not taxed increased by 4%, with most such purchases being attributed to bottled water. Id.  
 72 Id. The study’s authors highlighted other variables concurrent with the soda tax as complicating 
the causation analysis, including changes in Mexico’s economy during that time, and other public 
health and anti-obesity programs specifically aimed at sugar-sweetened beverages. Id. “Sugar-
sweetened beverages” are drinks that contain sweeteners such as sucrose, high-fructose corn syrup, or 
fruit-juice concentrates. Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1599 (2009). 
 73 See Brownell et al., supra note 72, at 1599 (describing the link between intake of sugar-
sweetened beverages and obesity and the potential reduction in health costs from taxing sugar-
sweetened beverages). In particular, a high intake of refined sugars increases triglyceride levels and 
blood pressure, which increases an individual’s risk for both heart disease and diabetes. Id. at 1601; 
see also Hines, supra note 6, at 50 (noting that revenue generated from sin taxes on gasoline may be 
used to fund highway construction and maintenance while taxes on alcohol and tobacco may be used 
to help cover related health care costs). 
 74 Brownell et al. supra note 72, at 1599. In the context of sugar-sweetened beverages, consumers 
may lack full and complete information about their consumption decisions and overweigh short-term 
decisions. Id. 
 75 Id. The social costs are not insignificant, with one study estimating that in 2008, the medical 
costs attributed to obesity-related care reached $147 billion annually, or roughly 9.1% of total U.S. 
health care expenditures. Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer-
and-Service-Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 822, 828 (2009). 
 76 See Newkirk, supra note 6 (noting that sin taxes are designed to both save people from them-
selves and protect those around them). 
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The cost of medical care for smoking-related conditions exceeds $130 bil-
lion annually in the United States.77 In terms of the human toll from smoking, 
secondhand smoke caused nearly 34,000 deaths from heart disease per year from 
2005 to 2009 among adults who didn’t smoke, and over 7300 deaths per year 
from lung cancer over the same period for adult non-smokers.78 
Although society clearly bears substantial costs for smoking-related illness-
es, smokers also tend to die earlier than non-smokers, meaning smokers actually 
save the public some money in the form of foregone social security benefits that 
they are unable to collect.79 However, despite those savings, smoking also costs 
approximately $151 billion per year in lost productivity due to premature deaths 
and an additional $5.6 billion per year in deaths attributable to secondhand 
smoke exposure.80 
The public health justifications for alcohol present a trickier case, given that 
not everyone who drinks alcohol does so in an abusive fashion.81 Moreover, the 
risk that drinking alcohol poses to others is usually associated with drinking and 
driving, which further narrows the number of people contributing to drunk driv-
ing deaths.82 
Nevertheless, an increase in the alcohol tax caused a notable decrease in 
monthly drunk driving deaths, particularly among young people in the two years 
following the tax increase.83 In addition, alcohol abuse imposes costs on others, 
as alcohol abusers often miss time at work, impose higher costs on the healthcare 
system, and impair family relationships.84 
The main argument advanced for non-traditional sin taxes like sugary drink 
and junk food taxes (collectively “anti-obesity taxes”) is that they will help re-
                                                                                                                           
 77 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—50 
YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 870 (2014), https://www.surgeon
general.gov/library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6TU-ZZFV]. 
 78 Secondhand Smoke (SHS) Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/general_facts/ [https://perma.cc/
MUG3-PCQC] (last updated Feb. 21, 2017). 
 79 Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1326 (2004). Smokers raise health care costs but offset those costs by saving 
the public from having to pay them retirement benefits for as long as non-smokers. Id. at 1241. 
 80 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., supra note 77, at 679. 
 81 See Baxandall, supra note 36, at 22 (noting that the risk drinkers pose to others has more to do 
with their driving habits than their drinking habits). Indeed, medical research has shown that drinking 
modest amounts of red wine can actually be beneficial to your health by reducing the risks of heart 
disease, stroke, and dementia. Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Alexander C. Wagenaar et al., Effects of a 2009 Illinois Alcohol Tax Increase on Fatal Motor 
Vehicle Crashes, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1880, 1885 (2015). Fatalities from drunk driving fell 9.9% 
per month in the two years following Illinois’ 2009 alcohol tax hike, which imposed a tax of 1 cent 
per serving of beer and 5 cents per serving of spirits. Id. at 1883. 
 84 Baxandall, supra note 36, at 22. 
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duce the ever-growing cost of health care.85 Anti-obesity tax advocates argue 
that because poor diet is linked to obesity and other chronic diseases, which are 
expensive to treat, their dietary choices impose costs on people of normal weight 
in the form of higher health care costs.86 These same advocates point out that 
obese individuals impose health care costs on all individuals, including non-
obese people, particularly if they are beneficiaries of a government-provided 
health care program.87 This additional layer of cost creates a negative externality 
because the private cost of health care for some individuals (the obese) has now 
spilled over and been absorbed into the public cost of health care generally, and 
anti-obesity tax advocates believe that soda taxes or junk food taxes present one 
solution to control these costs.88 Despite the appeal of this argument, there simp-
ly isn’t enough evidence at this time to suggest that these taxes make individuals 
any healthier, let alone contribute to bettering the public’s health.89 Data regard-
ing the public health benefits of non-traditional sin taxes, such as sugary drink 
taxes are simply not as robust compared to the public health effects associated 
with traditional sin taxes.90 
D. A New Era of Sin Taxes 
Today, much of the impetus for expanding the sin tax base has come from 
the growing need for governments to raise revenue, as legislators face tightening 
budgets and growing deficits.91 In addition to raising the rates applicable to ex-
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Katherine Pratt, A Constructive Critique of Public Health Arguments for Anti-obesity Soda 
Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 TUL. L. REV. 73, 77 (2012) (noting that advocates of obesity taxes are 
invoking the same public health arguments as supporters of tobacco taxes have relied on in the past). 
Obese people pay 36% more for health care and spend 77% more on medication than people of aver-
age weight. Id. at 84. 
 86 Id. at 77–78. The higher health care costs attributable to caring for obese persons can be im-
posed directly through taxpayer-funded programs such as Medicaid, or indirectly by making insurance 
premiums more expensive. Id.; see Brownell, supra note 72 (describing the potential taxes on sugar-
sweetened beverages have to reduce health care costs). 
 87 Pratt, supra note 85, at 78; see Brownell, supra note 72, at 1599 (noting that taxing sugar-
sweetened beverages can promote good health care outcomes and help recoup health care costs asso-
ciated with their consumption). 
 88 Brownell, supra note 72, at 1599; Pratt, supra note 85, at 78. 
 89 Newkirk, supra note 6. 
 90 Id. Even if the negative externalities argument were accepted for non-traditional sin taxes like 
junk food and soda taxes, it would still be difficult to isolate the contribution of specific foods or 
drinks to obesity. Pratt, supra note 85, at 86. 
 91 Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5. Increasing sin taxes was one of the strategies employed by 
state and local governments for making up some of the revenue shortfall due to the Great Recession. 
Id. The Philadelphia soda tax campaign focused on the ability to help fund new public programs like 
universal preschool with the influx of revenue and did not emphasize the public health benefits which 
had been the primary message of earlier, failed campaigns in Philadelphia. Vauhini Vara, There’s 
Now a Soda Tax in Philadelphia, But Not Because Sugar Is Bad for You, NEW YORKER (June 16, 
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/theres-now-a-soda-tax-in-philadelphia-but-not-
because-sugar-is-bad-for-you [https://perma.cc/6PWM-SMLR]. 
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isting sin taxes on alcohol and tobacco, legislators at all levels of government are 
actively trying to expand the scope of sin taxes to cover other products and ser-
vices.92 To date, legislators have already taken aim at soda, junk food, tanning, 
strip clubs, and environmentally unfriendly consumption such as plastic bag 
use.93 
To wit, on June 16, 2016, Philadelphia became the largest U.S. city to pass 
a soda tax.94 Subsequently, several other cities have passed taxes on sugary 
drinks as a means to combat obesity, including San Francisco, Oakland, and 
Boulder.95 The recent flurry of soda taxes perhaps suggests that public opinion is 
finally turning with respect to accepting non-traditional sin taxes.96 
In Chicago, a “check-out bag tax” of seven cents per disposable bag went 
into effect in all retail stores on February 1, 2017, with the cost at most large 
chain retailers like Walgreens, Target, CVS, and Whole Foods passed directly on 
to customers.97 The revenue from the tax, which applies to disposable paper bags 
as well as disposable plastic bags, will be split between the city of Chicago and 
the retailer, with the tax intended to encourage consumers to rely on more envi-
ronmentally friendly reusable bags.98 
II. THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF SIN TAXES: THE BITTER WITH THE SWEET 
Sin taxes have enjoyed tremendous success in raising revenue, and that 
success has not gone unnoticed as today’s legislators try to recoup the tax reve-
nue that was lost during the Great Recession.99 Nevertheless, sin taxes are not 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Perkins, supra note 5, at 153. For example, the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthor-
ization Act, signed into law in February 2009 by President Obama, effectively tripled the federal tax 
on tobacco products. Id.; see also Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5 (noting that from 2000 to 2015, 
there were 111 increases in tobacco taxes and 23 increases in alcohol taxes). 
 93 Perkins, supra note 5, at 153; see Hoffer, supra note 12, at 20 (noting that in Minnesota a 6.5% 
tax is levied on fur clothing and that in Alabama purchases of playing cards are subject to a ten-cent 
tax). 
 94 Sanger-Katz, supra note 1 (stating that the passage of the sugary drinks tax in Philadelphia is 
notable because Philadelphia is one of the largest U.S. cities and also one of the poorest). 
 95 Allison Aubrey, Souring on Sweet? Voters in 4 Cities Pass Soda Tax Measures, NPR (Nov. 9, 
2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/11/09/501472007/souring-on-sweet-voters-in-4-
cities-pass-soda-tax-measures [https://perma.cc/898U-T44W]. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Lauren Zumbach, Chicago’s Bag Tax Takes Effect Wednesday. Here’s What You Need to 
Know., CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-chicago-checkout-bag-
tax-0127-biz-20170126-story.html [https://perma.cc/MR4S-ZSAZ]. Chicago had attempted to ban 
disposable plastic bags earlier, before passing the seven-cent tax on both disposable paper and plastic 
bags. Id. 
 98 Id. Notwithstanding the new disposable bag tax, Whole Foods and Target will continue to offer 
customers some money back for each reusable bag used. Id. 
 99 Hoffer, supra note 12, at 2. 
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costless instruments for raising revenue, and there are several negative conse-
quences accompaying the passage of any sin tax.100 
Section A of this Part sets forth the negative consequences of implementing 
sin taxes which should curb the enthusiasm of legislators seeking to expand the 
reach of sin taxes into new domains.101 Section B presents some alternatives 
regulators may consider to replace or supplement sin taxes in their efforts to curb 
unhealthy private behaviors and improve public health.102 
A. The Negative Effects of Sin Taxes 
While the revenue-raising justification may be enough on its own for some 
lawmakers to impose a sin tax, lawmakers should nevertheless be aware of the 
regressive nature and negative consequences associated with sin taxes before 
designating new categories of goods and services as sins.103 Subsection 1 of this 
Section addresses one major criticism of sin taxes, namely their regressivity and 
the fact that they tend to disproportionately impact the poor.104 Subsection 2 dis-
cusses other negative consequences of sin taxes, including the diversion of 
promised tax revenues to fund specific programs, the tendency of sin taxes to 
trigger lobbying and advertising wars, and the rise of black markets as consum-
ers attempt to avoid paying sin taxes.105 
1. Sin Taxes Are Regressive, Hitting the Poorest Members of Society the 
Hardest 
While sin taxes are undoubtedly attractive policy tools given their effec-
tiveness in raising revenue and the relative ease with which they can be passed, 
they also tend to disproportionately burden lower income individuals.106 Similar 
to sales and excise taxes, a sin tax is regressive because the poor spend a greater 
percentage of their income to pay the tax as compared to their wealthier counter-
                                                                                                                           
 100 See infra notes 103–129 and accompanying text. 
 101 See infra notes 103–129 and accompanying text. 
 102 See infra notes 130–159 and accompanying text. 
 103 See Hoffer, supra note 11 (describing how sin taxes may harm society through, inter alia, its 
regressive nature and tendency to spur wasteful spending on lobbying for and against the tax). 
 104 See infra notes 106–118 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 119–129 and accompanying text. 
 106 Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5; see also Brownell, supra note 72, at 1603 (noting that the 
poor tend to be more affected by smoking-related illnesses and have health problems related to bad 
eating habits); Perkins, supra note 5, at 166 (noting that a $3 tax on cigarettes weighs more heavily on 
a poor person than a wealthier person). 
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parts.107 In some ways, the poor are actually burdened twice because they also 
disproportionately consume more sinful goods and services.108 
Unlike income taxes, which incorporate progressive features that help cor-
relate income level with the ability to pay, such as lower rates for the poor and 
tax-exempt status for the poorest, sin taxes completely lack these elements.109 
Sin taxes violate both horizontal and vertical tax equity, two cornerstone princi-
ples of tax policy design.110 Sin taxes violate horizontal tax equity because sin 
tax liability only falls upon individuals who actually purchase the sinful good or 
service; two individuals earning the same income as each other may owe com-
pletely different amounts of sin tax.111 Sin taxes also violate vertical tax equity 
because the amount of the tax paid by a rich “sinner” is not any greater than the 
amount of tax owed by the poor sinner.112 Indeed, sin taxes not only dispropor-
tionately affect the poor, but are also an indiscriminate tool that applies to re-
sponsible consumers and lifelong addicts alike.113 
In the soda context, a Gallup poll conducted in 2013 showed that non-
whites and low-income Americans drank more regular soda (as opposed to diet 
soda) than other Americans.114 The same poll also found, unsurprisingly, that 
overweight Americans were more likely to drink soda.115 Similarly, a 2008 study 
of New York City adults found that individuals living in households with an in-
come of twice the poverty level or less were more likely to drink soda than those 
from higher income households.116 Thus, socially disadvantaged populations, 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Hoffer, supra note 12, at 14. The poor, by virtue of their income level, also have fewer substi-
tutes available to them to switch to, making their consumption of sinful goods even more inelastic. Id. 
 108 Id.; see Aubrey, supra note 3 (noting that the Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney seemed to 
acknowledge the fact that the poor seem to drink more soda than their wealthier peers when he criti-
cized the soda industry for making “enormous profits on the backs of poor people”). 
 109 Otero, supra note 59. In Quebec, the tobacco tax hits the poor four times harder than the 
wealthy, with the wealthiest spending about 1.4% of their income on tobacco taxes and the poorest 
spending about 5.2%. MINARDI & POULIOT, supra note 14, at 3. 
 110 Hoffer, supra note 56, at 8. 
 111 Id. Horizontal tax equity requires individuals with the same level of income to shoulder the 
same tax burden while vertical tax equity demands that wealthier individuals should have to pay 
greater taxes than their poorer counterparts. Id.; see also Pratt, supra note 85, at 123 (noting that in the 
United States, individuals generally prefer progressive taxes which scale taxes based on ability to pay 
and dislike regressive taxes which are not so calibrated). 
 112 Hoffer, supra note 56, at 8. 
 113 Baxandall, supra note 36, at 19. 
 114 Elizabeth Mendes, Regular Soda Popular with Young, Nonwhite, Low-Income, GALLUP (Aug. 
15, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163997/regular-soda-popular-young-nonwhite-low-income.
aspx?version=print [https://perma.cc/GS4Q-5H7C] (indicating that 45% of those earning less than 
$30,000 per year drank regular soda, while only 20% of those earning $75,000 per year or more drank 
regular soda). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Colin D. Rehm et al., Demographic and Behavioral Factors Associated with Daily Sugar-
sweetened Soda Consumption in New York City Adults, 85 J. URB. HEALTH 375, 378 (2008). The 
study found that soda consumption was also tied to television watching, with 38% of those watching 
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which are the groups most impacted by obesity and most likely to be frequent 
soda consumers, are more directly hit by a soda tax.117 These taxes erode the 
disposable income of the poor, making it more difficult for them to meet their 
immediate needs and prioritize their long-term health.118 
2. Sin Taxes May Lead to Misappropriated Tax Revenues, Wasteful 
Spending, and the Creation of Black Markets for Sinful Goods and 
Services 
In addition to disproportionately affecting the poor, sin taxes also have oth-
er significant negative consequences.119 For example, sin taxes are often ad-
vanced as helping fund specific programs and worthy causes, but sometimes 
these funds are used to satisfy other expenditures leaving only a small portion to 
the originally promised programs.120 Similarly, sin tax advocates have publicly 
promised to link sin tax revenues to help fund certain causes in order to help get 
the tax passed, with the public only discovering after the fact that much of the 
promised revenue will actually be used to fund causes that were not previously 
mentioned.121 One reason sin tax revenues are often successfully diverted is that 
they target unpopular activities, and therefore, when cigarette tax revenue paid 
by smokers, for example, is used to help fund health care for low income indi-
viduals, neither the public at large nor politicians typically speak up in opposi-
                                                                                                                           
five or more hours of television per day being frequent soda consumers, compared to 21% of those 
watching less than an hour of television per day. Id. 
 117 See id. (finding that among New York City adults, frequent consumption of sugar-sweetened 
soda was correlated with low household income). The article hypothesizes that the low cost of soda 
and the marketing in convenience stores which are commonly found in low-income New York City 
neighborhoods could explain the higher rates of soda consumption among the poor. Id. at 382. 
 118 Rachel E. Morse, Note, Resisting the Path of Least Resistance: Why the Texas “Pole Tax” and 
the New Class of Modern Sin Taxes Are Bad Policy, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 189, 208 (2009); 
Benjamin B. Lockwood, Regressive Sin Taxes 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
23085, 2017); see Hoffer et al., supra note 56, at 35 (suggesting that wealthier individuals have an 
easier time prioritizing their long-run health compared to their poorer counterparts). 
 119 See MINARDI & POULIOT, supra note 14 (noting that sin taxes may negatively impact the most 
disadvantaged populations in society). 
 120 Id. For example, in Quebec, the government increased the tobacco tax to fund the construction 
of a stadium, but only 18.4% of the 48% in revenue originally promised to the project was actually 
used for the stadium’s construction. Id. 
 121 Vargas, supra note 14. In Philadelphia, Mayor Kenney promised to use the soda tax revenues 
to fund early childhood education, but only 49% of the revenue from the soda tax will go to pre-
kindergarten education. Id. 
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tion.122 Thus, sin taxes may help legislators cloak their true intentions under the 
guise of reducing some social harm.123 
Another major criticism of sin taxes is that the debate over their passage 
leads to wasteful spending, with millions of dollars being spent on lobbying ef-
forts to fight their passage.124 Indeed, the American Beverage Association alone 
has spent millions to combat soda taxes across the country, even donating ten 
million dollars to a Philadelphia children’s hospital as a display of goodwill.125 
Conversely, proponents of soda taxes must raise substantial sums of money in 
order to narrow the funding gap in advertising and promotion of the taxes.126 
Sin taxes also incentivize different methods of tax avoidance either legally, 
through online purchases and cross-border purchases, or illegally, through the 
creation of black markets and trafficking, with the result being that governments 
not only lose a portion of sin tax revenue, but must also expend significant addi-
tional resources to combat tax evaders.127 According to estimates by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, illegal cigarette trafficking, involving buying cigarettes in 
bulk from lower tobacco tax jurisdictions and transporting them into higher to-
bacco tax jurisdictions for resale, costs the Federal and state governments ap-
proximately five billion dollars in revenue each year.128 In Denmark, the gov-
ernment passed a short-lived “fat tax” in October 2011 on foods with more than 
2.3% saturated fat, only to find that its citizens did not decrease their consump-
tion but rather engaged in cross-border shopping and went abroad for their gro-
ceries to avoid the tax.129 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Kelly Phillips Erb, Massachusetts Cigarette Taxes Raise Millions but Not for Anti-
Smoking Programs, FORBES (July 15, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2016/
07/15/massachusetts-cigarette-taxes-raise-millions-but-not-for-anti-smoking-programs/#35d79bce5a02 
[https://perma.cc/B57C-FRJ5] (reporting that not a single penny of the $285 million generated from 
Massachusetts’ $1 per pack cigarette tax was used to fund anti-smoking programs). 
 123 See MINARDI & POULIOT, supra note 14 (noting that sometimes sin taxes are redirected to 
fund programs that are unrelated to the reasons for the sin tax). Of course, sin tax revenues can also be 
redirected in the case of traditional sin taxes such as cigarette taxes. Erb, supra note 122. 
 124 Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5; Hoffer, supra note 11. 
 125 Vara, supra note 91. The American Beverage Association has thrown its considerable weight 
into fighting soda taxes before, having spent over $100,000 in 2012 to defeat a soda tax campaign in 
Richmond, California. Id. 
 126 Id. As part of Berkeley’s campaign to pass their soda tax, the city spent over $900,000 
($650,000 of which came from former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg), but was still out-
spent by the American Beverage Association, which doled out over $2 million to fight the tax. Id. 
 127 Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5. 
 128 Id. Smuggling cigarettes is an especially big problem in some states like Illinois because of the 
much lower tax rates for cigarettes in nearby Missouri and Kentucky. Id. 
 129 MINARDI & POULIOT, supra note 14, at 3. The Danish government eventually abolished the fat 
tax just a year later in November 2012 and also scuttled its plans to impose a sugar tax. Id. 
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B. Alternatives to Sin Taxes 
If governments genuinely care about improving the health of their citizens, 
there are a variety of ways apart from sin taxes to advance the public welfare.130 
Subsection 1 of this Section discusses the use of direct regulation, including the 
effects an outright ban on sinful goods and services would likely have.131 Sub-
section 2 discusses proposals related to improving the quality of information 
consumers receive at the time of purchase, which could help consumers make 
better decisions, all other things being equal.132 Finally, Subsection 3 discusses 
ways in which governments may improve consumer access to healthier substi-
tutes, in effect using a “carrot” to incentivize and facilitate healthier purchases 
instead of the “stick” of sin taxes.133 
1. Direct Regulation: Outright Bans of the Sinful Good or Service 
Outright bans of the sinful good or service are one way in which govern-
ments may take direct aim at the underlying sin, but they are not without their 
own problems.134 Outright bans of a sinful good may seem like an extreme 
measure, but they have been tried in some countries, with varying degrees of 
success.135 For example, in March 2017, Kenya announced it would ban plastic 
bags, joining Rwanda which banned non-biodegradable plastic bags in 2008.136 
An outright ban may generate negative unintended consequences, such as 
giving rise to black markets for the sinful good or service.137 Indeed, even ex-
tremely high cigarette taxes in New York and Washington State have led to 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See generally Gary Sacks et al., ‘Traffic-light’ Nutrition Labelling and ‘Junk-food’ Tax: A 
Modelled Comparison of Cost-Effectiveness for Obesity Prevention, 35 INT’L J. OBESITY 1001, 1001–
1009 (2011) (comparing the costs of imposing sin taxes on junk food against a policy which would 
require nutrition labelling to be displayed on the front of unhealthy foods). 
 131 See infra notes 134–140 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 141–150 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 151–159 and accompanying text. 
 134 See Adam J. Hoffer et al., Sin Taxes and Sindustry: Revenue, Paternalism, and Political Inter-
est, 19 INDEP. REV. 47, 47, 50 (2014) (noting that a complete ban would lead to several undesirable 
consequences). 
 135 See Kenya Tries to Ban Plastic Bags—Again, THE ECONOMIST (May 23, 2017), http://www.
economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21719471-will-ban-make-kenya-cleaner-or-start-black-
market-bags-kenya-tries [https://perma.cc/YVL7-HLAV] [hereinafter Kenya Ban] (noting that Kenya 
had tried and failed to prohibit plastic bags on two other occasions in 2007 and 2011); see also 
Zumbach, supra note 97 (stating that Chicago had tried and failed to ban disposable plastic bags be-
fore successfully passing a seven cent tax on disposable paper and plastic bags). 
 136 Emilie Clavel, Think You Can’t Live Without Plastic Bags? Consider This: Rwanda Did It, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/15/rwanda-
banned-plastic-bags-so-can-we [https://perma.cc/XL8X-NGLY] (describing how Rwanda banned 
plastic bags in 2008 and the country’s plans to potentially ban other types of plastic as well); Kenya 
Ban, supra note 135. Kenyans are estimated to use about twenty-four million plastic bags each month, 
or roughly two per person. Kenya Ban, supra note 135. 
 137 Kenya Ban, supra note 135. 
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cross-border shopping and expanding black markets for cigarettes.138 In Rwan-
da, after the government banned plastic bags, a black market arose selling plastic 
bags smuggled in from nearby Congo.139 In addition, outright bans may cause 
economic harm and job loss to the industry whose goods are subject to the ban, 
and consumers looking to avoid the ban may simply switch to other alternatives, 
which would severely undermine the benefits of the ban.140 
2. Improved Labeling of Sinful Goods and Services 
While taxes (through higher prices) may signal to consumers the unhealthy 
nature of certain items like sugary drinks, some advocates have proposed that 
such signals be made more clear and explicit, with manufacturers of sinful goods 
being required to feature health warning labels directly on their products.141 Un-
der this approach, consumers would be given additional and higher quality in-
formation to encourage them to make healthier choices prior to making a pur-
chase, rather than being punished for their sinful purchases after the fact.142 
For example, as a consequence of the Affordable Care Act and other state 
and local laws, chain restaurants will be required to label their menu items with 
information including the number of calories in their offerings.143 With the calor-
ic content of menu items more transparent to restaurant patrons, the new menu 
labeling requirements are designed to incentivize restaurants to introduce health-
ier alternatives, and indeed, many restaurants have developed healthier, lower-
calorie items in response.144 
                                                                                                                           
 138 Hoffer, supra note 134, at 50. According to 2013 statistics from the Washington State De-
partment of Revenue, it is estimated that some 101.4 million packs of cigarettes in Washington were 
purchased without paying the cigarette tax. Id. 
 139 Kenya Ban, supra note 135. 
 140 Id. Given a ban on plastic bags, some speculate that consumers will respond by turning to 
paper bags which would put greater stress on forests. Id. 
 141 Eliza Barclay, Warning Labels Might Help Parents Buy Fewer Sugary Drinks, Study Finds, 
NPR (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/01/14/463061869/warning-labels-
might-help-parents-buy-fewer-sugary-drinks-study-finds [https://perma.cc/2T4D-KWVD]. Currently, 
California, New York, and Baltimore are considering proposals that would make labeling sugary 
drinks with health warnings mandatory. Id. 
 142 See Hoffer, supra note 56 (noting that some economists have proposed better educating con-
sumers about the health consequences of their consumption choices and increasing the visibility of 
healthier alternatives). 
 143 Menu Labeling Requirements, https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/Guidance
DocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm515020.htm [https://perma.cc/R75P-3DZ6] 
(last updated Nov. 11, 2017). The menu labeling rule applies to restaurants and chain retail food estab-
lishments with twenty or more locations. Id. Though the menu labeling requirement originated as part 
of the Affordable Care Act and set an initial deadline of December 1, 2015, for restaurants to comply 
with the requirements, the compliance date has since been extended several times with the current 
deadline now set for May 7, 2018. Id. 
 144 Pratt, supra note 85, at 90. The restaurant Romano’s Macaroni Grill has already revamped its 
fettucine alfredo dish in the wake of a federal menu labeling law to reduce its calorie count from 1,130 
to 770 calories and nearly halved its saturated fat content. Id. at 122. In anticipation of the new menu 
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In a study of approximately 2400 parents from a variety of backgrounds, 
researchers found that sixty percent of parents would choose to purchase a sugar-
sweetened beverage if that beverage did not have a health-warning label affixed 
to it.145 Interestingly, the number of parents who would choose to purchase the 
sugar-sweetened beverage dropped to forty percent if the sugar-sweetened bev-
erage had a warning label on it.146 Thus, the study indicates that in the context of 
sugary drinks, providing more information to parents on the health effects of 
sugary drinks may constitute a major factor in their ultimate purchasing deci-
sions for their children.147 
In the context of junk food, so-called “traffic-light nutrition labelling” pro-
posals which would mark foods with different colors based on their total fat, sat-
urated fat, sugar, and salt contents have gained traction in recent years.148 A 2011 
Australian study analyzed the effects of traffic-light labelling on junk food and 
found that the enhanced labelling would lead to similar body mass index and 
weight reductions in both males and females compared to if those same items 
were instead subject to an obesity tax.149 Thus, both the sugar-sweetened bever-
age study and the traffic-light nutrition labelling study seem to strongly suggest 
that providing consumers with better nutritional information and education 
through enhanced labelling can promote healthier decision-making and life-
styles.150 
3. Improving Access to Healthier Alternatives 
Proponents of sin taxes argue that consumers will simply switch to healthi-
er substitutes when faced with a sin tax on a good, but this view presupposes that 
a healthier substitute exists (what would a healthy substitute be for a cigarette?) 
that is comparable in price and a reasonably good substitute for the sinful 
                                                                                                                           
labeling requirements, chains like Starbucks, Au Bon Pain, and The Cheesecake Factory have re-
sponded by reworking their offerings and developing lower-calorie alternatives. Id. 
 145 See Christina A. Roberto et al., The Influence of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Health Warning 
Labels on Parents’ Choices, 137 PEDIATRICS 1, 6, 9 (2016) (concluding that health warning labels on 
sugary drinks have increased parents’ awareness of the health consequences associated with consum-
ing the beverages and may lead to parents decreasing purchases of sugary drinks for their children). 
 146 Id. The warning labels featured text such as: “Safety Warning: Drinking beverages with added 
sugar[s] contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.” Id. 
 147 See Barclay, supra note 141 (cautioning that the study is encouraging but does not offer any 
details on how effective the warning labels might be if implemented in reality). 
 148 See generally Sacks, supra note 130. Traffic-light nutrition labelling would use the three col-
ors on a traffic light to mark whether the food contains low (green), medium (yellow), or high (red) 
levels of that nutrient. Id. at 1002. Traffic-light nutrition labelling has been recommended by the Food 
Standard Agency in the United Kingdom since 2006. Id. 
 149 Id. at 1005. 
 150 See Barclay, supra note 141 (noting that labels on sugary drinks put consumers on notice 
about the negative consequences of consuming the beverages and also seemed to affect their buying 
decisions). 
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item.151 Thus, in addition to the fact that consumers may not know of viable, 
healthier substitutes for their sinful consumption, consumers also may not have 
proper access to them, even if they were made aware of their existence.152 A 
2009 study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, found that 2.3 million fami-
lies live both over a mile away from a supermarket and do not have a car.153 
Food deserts, defined as areas that lack a supermarket, moreover tend to be asso-
ciated with poorer and minority neighborhoods.154 Thus, governments need to be 
cognizant of the fact that even if consumers could be convinced to live healthier 
lives and steer away from unhealthy consumption, some consumers may be una-
ble to, owing to a lack of access to healthier alternatives and ready access to fast 
food.155 People who live in areas with limited access to supermarkets tend to 
turn to small grocery or convenience stores, which often either do not sell the 
same selection of healthy foods as supermarkets or sell them at a substantial 
markup.156 Thus, in many cases, the same price conscious consumers who would 
be subject to sin taxes on unhealthy items are effectively taxed on access to 
healthy foods as well by virtue of where they live.157 
While some have pointed out that poorer areas may not have the demand to 
support an affordable healthy food supply, governments could, for example, of-
fer subsidies or alter their zoning policies to incentivize supermarkets to set up 
shop in underserved areas.158 Further, changing consumer preferences by provid-
ing better nutritional education and information on these products may also drum 
up demand for healthier goods.159 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Hoffer, supra note 56, at 10 (suggesting that one reason consumers are relatively indiffer-
ent about price changes in soda, candy, and fast food may be that they simply are either unaware of or 
cannot find adequate substitutes). 
 152 Id. The elasticity of demand for a good depends on the availability of viable substitutes for 
that good, with goods which have relatively few substitutes tending to be demand-inelastic. Id. 
 153 ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE AND NUTRITIOUS 
FOOD: MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING FOOD DESERTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 35 (2009). 
Another 3.4 million households, or 3.2% of the U.S. population, live between a half mile and one mile 
from a supermarket and do not own a car. Id. at 20. 
 154 Renee E. Walker et al., Disparities and Access to Healthy Food in the United States: A Review 
of Food Deserts Literature, 16 HEALTH & PLACE 876, 876 (2010). In addition to having fewer super-
markets, studies have found that residents in minority neighborhoods also are more frequently target-
ed by advertisements for tobacco and alcohol products and have a harder time gaining access to medi-
cations. Id. 
 155 See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 153 (noting that the types of foods individuals have 
access to are important factors in their diet and their risk for obesity and other related diseases). 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. (detailing one study of 40,000 U.S. households which found that consumers who get 
their groceries from convenience stores usually pay higher prices on average compared to those who 
shop at supermarkets). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
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III. THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF SIN TAXES AND SUGGESTED  
REFORMS FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE SIN TAXES 
The twin aims of sin taxes, raising revenue and curbing the quantity of so-
cially undesirable behaviors, are in fact intimately tied to one another and in 
constant tension.160 Governments should be aware that the revenue raised by sin 
taxes tends to be unsustainable and actually may decline over time, suggesting 
that while a sin tax may be effective in deterring some sinful consumption, its 
effects are not limitless, particularly in the long run.161 By way of illustration, 
tobacco taxes have been successful in decreasing smoking amongst existing 
smokers and in deterring new users from taking up smoking, but studies also 
have shown that after the initial decline in usage, there is a point where the level 
of consumption no longer decreases.162 This suggests that there seems to be a 
segment of the smoking population whose demand is so inelastic that any price 
increases in the form of tobacco taxes has no effect at all on their purchases of 
tobacco products.163 Indeed, legislators must understand that a key limitation of 
sin taxes is that they exhibit diminishing marginal returns with respect to curbing 
demand of sinful goods, with successive tax increases eventually producing few-
er benefits on net.164 
Interestingly, regardless of the actual sin tax rate set by governments, the 
quantity of sinful consumption is also constrained from the outset by the price-
elasticity of the good.165 In studies measuring consumer responsiveness to price 
                                                                                                                           
 160 MINARDI & POULIOT, supra note 14, at 1. If sin taxes effectively reduce consumption of sinful 
goods and services, then the amount of tax revenue governments are able to collect from sin taxes will 
fall. Id.; see Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5 (questioning whether sin taxes are truly intended to 
curb sinful behaviors or simply raise revenue for state governments). 
 161 Mattoon & Wetmore, supra note 5. Government revenue does increase with rises in tobacco 
taxes, but the additional revenue is not always maintainable over time. Id. 
 162 MINARDI & POULIOT, supra note 14. 
 163 Id. In Quebec for instance, 40% of Quebecers smoked in 1987, but from 2003–2014, tobacco 
usage stayed at around 24% notwithstanding the fact that in the same time period, the price of ciga-
rettes increased by 100%. Id. 
 164 See id. (warning that while sin tax increases have been justified because of their ability to 
change consumption habits, such desired changes may not always be feasible). When taxes no longer 
decrease the individual’s consumption level, the sin tax effectively operates to punish that individual 
by forcing them to pay ever increasing prices for the sinful good. Id.; see also Mattoon & Wetmore, 
supra note 5 (discussing that while sin taxes have been criticized for being regressive and dispropor-
tionately burdening the poor, the poor are also more likely to quit smoking as a result of higher tobac-
co taxes, and thus also disproportionately benefit from the sin tax). 
 165 See Hoffer, supra note 56, at 8–9 (describing several studies that sought to quantify the medi-
an price elasticity (a measure of consumers’ responsiveness to price changes) for various sinful goods, 
with the median price elasticity of sweets found to be -0.34, meaning that a 1% increase in the price of 
sweets only reduced consumption by 0.34%). A price elasticity that has an absolute value less than 
one means the good is demand-inelastic. Id. at 9. By way of comparison, cigarettes and alcohol had 
approximately the same median price elasticities of -0.40 and -0.497, respectively, while soft drinks 
had a median price elasticity of -0.79, suggesting consumers are much more responsive to changes in 
the price of soft drinks than cigarettes or alcohol. Id. 
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changes in soft drinks, sweets, cigarettes, and alcohol, researchers found that the 
price elasticity for each of these items was well below one, which means that a 
1% increase in price (as a result of the tax) produces a less than 1% reduction in 
quantity.166 Consequently, while sin taxes do influence individual behavior, their 
ability to affect consumer purchases is somewhat attenuated given the strongly 
inelastic nature of the sins being taxed.167 
While sin taxes are far from perfect tools, governments may redesign them 
in certain ways to better serve both their revenue-raising and consumption curb-
ing goals.168 For starters, the amount of the tax is often either too large or too 
small.169 Taxes on alcohol tend to be set too low to discourage consumption 
while taxes on tobacco products are so high that they eliminate smoking alto-
gether.170 Ironically, if a sin tax is set too high, it will be too effective at discour-
aging unhealthy consumption and raise little revenue, but if the tax is set too low, 
it will provide considerable revenue but not curb sinful consumption in any 
meaningful manner.171 
In addition to more precisely calibrating the actual amount of sin taxes, the 
revenue derived from some sin taxes is usually not designated for public health 
programs at all.172 For example, in Philadelphia, the soda tax was advertised to 
primarily help fund universal prekindergarten and not anti-obesity programs.173 
In this context, earmarking some of the revenue to fund nutritional programs and 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Id. at 9. 
 167 Id. 
 168 See Brownell, supra note 72 (noting that while taxing sugar-sweetened beverages may lead to 
private and public health benefits, such taxes are often too small to be effective at deterring consump-
tion of sugary drinks). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Hoffer, supra note 56, at 3. 
 171 MINARDI & POULIOT, supra note 14, at 3. Furthermore, if sin taxes are set too high, black mar-
kets for the taxed good may arise and thus dramatically reduce the amount of sin tax revenue collected. 
See SCOTT DRENKARD, CIGARETTE TAXES AND CIGARETTE SMUGGLING BY STATE, 2015 1 (2017), 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171106130335/Tax-Foundation-FF565.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MGF-
CZRL] (finding that New York, which has the highest cigarette tax in the country, also had the highest 
rate of smuggled cigarettes entering the state, with about 56.8% of cigarettes consumed in New York in 
2015 having entered as a result of smuggling); Kevin Hartnett, Boston’s Black-market Cigarette Prob-
lem, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 2, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/02/02/boston-black-market-
cigarette-problem/mJpfuuFZXXYxrBiEgTcyJM/story.html [https://perma.cc/ZKK3-BNFJ] (reporting 
that in Boston, approximately 40% of cigarettes consumed were obtained through the black market as 
part of smokers’ efforts to avoid the state cigarette tax). Smuggling can be casual, involving small quanti-
ties purchased in one area being transported to another for personal consumption, or commercial, operat-
ing on a larger scale and potentially involving counterfeit state tax stamps or counterfeit sinful goods 
themselves. DRENKARD, supra. 
 172 See Vargas, supra note 14 (describing how revenue from the soda tax passed in Philadelphia 
would be divided up amongst homelessness programs, disability settlements, parks and recreation, and 
early childhood education). 
 173 Id. Indeed, of the $409.5 million projected to be raised in the five years after the passage of the 
Philadelphia soda tax, only $4.5 million will be allocated to providing a healthy beverages tax credit. 
Id. 
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anti-obesity efforts instead of universal prekindergarten would more directly 
help the same populations that are hit hardest by the tax.174 Highlighting the im-
portance of how the sin tax revenue will be utilized is a 2008 poll of New York 
residents in which 52% of those polled said they would support a soda tax, with 
the percentage in support of a soda tax jumping up to 72% if the soda tax reve-
nue was specifically used to support anti-obesity programs for children and 
adults.175 Thus, lawmakers would do well to consider tying sin tax revenues to 
programs that take aim at the heart of the underlying sinful consumption, as do-
ing so may increase their chances of garnering the public support that is so cru-
cial to getting a particular sin tax passed.176 
In consideration of the foregoing, one way to overcome the inherent tension 
of sin taxes would be to adopt a hybrid approach: first, calibrate sin taxes to a 
moderate level that maximizes tax revenue, earmark those revenues to fund pub-
lic health programs, and then regulate manufacturers of sinful goods directly to 
help curb sinful behavior and advance the public health.177 For example, in the 
context of obesity taxes, governments could pass sin taxes on sugary drinks and 
fatty foods (and thus generate much needed revenue), but couple these taxes 
with traffic-light nutritional labeling and initiatives to increase consumer access 
to healthier alternatives.178 If governments truly seek to justify non-traditional 
sin taxes on the basis of their public health benefits, then it may be more effec-
tive to rely on more targeted measures, such as imposing mandatory labelling on 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Brownell, supra note 72, at 1603. When it comes to tobacco taxes, some of the tax revenue 
has been specifically directed towards programs for the poor, who tend to be the most impacted by 
smoking-related illnesses. Id. 
 175 Id. at 1603–04; see Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and 
Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 856–57 (2000) (suggesting that taxing 
soft drinks, candy, chips, and other snack foods could help raise substantial revenues for public health 
campaigns). Public health building campaigns can be quite cost-effective, as a push to get consumers 
to drink lower fat milk in Clarksburg, West Virginia, significantly increased the number of people 
drinking fat-free milk at a total cost of only about twenty-two cents per person over seven weeks. 
Jacobson & Brownell, supra, at 857. 
 176 See Brownell, supra note 72 (suggesting that taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages are most 
popular when the revenues are used for nutritional and anti-obesity programs). 
 177 See Jacobson & Brownell, supra note 175 (proposing that governments tax high-calorie, fatty 
and sugary foods modestly and use the revenues to support public health initiatives); Hoffer, supra 
note 56, at 4 (describing how programs that seek to provide consumers with better information may 
influence their purchasing decisions). Calibrating the sin tax rate to the proper level can both raise 
revenue and shift consumption to benefit public health. Hoffer, supra note 56, at 6–7. 
 178 See Hoffer, supra note 56, at 4 (noting the limitations of both sin taxes, which bring in revenue 
but may not carry all of the public health benefits in theory, and purely behavioral policies which may 
positively affect consumer behavior but do not generate any revenue). See generally Walker, supra 
note 154 (noting that the differences in morbidity and mortality among neighborhoods may be partial-
ly explained by the presence or absence of supermarkets). 
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sinful goods and services to help consumers make healthier purchase deci-
sions.179 
While sin taxes can be very powerful “sticks” in affecting consumer deci-
sion-making, a redesigned sin tax which combines sin taxes with a few more 
“carrots” to nudge consumers into making healthier consumption decisions for 
themselves and those around them may well achieve the best of both worlds.180 
CONCLUSION 
Sin taxes have been and remain a tremendously valuable tool for govern-
ments around the world to raise revenue. However, as the list of sins has ex-
panded, many goods and services are being branded as sins not because they are 
socially harmful, but simply because they are merely disfavored or unpopular. 
The successes sin taxes have enjoyed and the relative lack of political resistance 
in passing them has made them an incredibly attractive tool for raising revenue, 
and the risk is now very real that lawmakers will fall down a slippery slope and 
tax any socially unpopular activity as a way to raise much needed funds. How-
ever, with many of the new non-traditional sin taxes, the public health justifica-
tions that have traditionally been cited in support of sin taxes do not apply with 
the same weight, if at all. At the same time, the costs in terms of regressivity and 
unintended consequences are far greater than with traditional sin taxes on alco-
hol and tobacco. Thus, governments must avoid the tantalizing low-hanging fruit 
that taxing socially stigmatized goods and services represent and consider alter-
natives to advancing public health, such as mandating warning labels on un-
healthy goods and services. If governments are to strike a proper balance be-
tween revenue-raising and curbing sinful consumption, they must both encour-
age and empower consumers to make healthier decisions for themselves and not 
rely solely on the stick of sin taxes. Sin taxes work well as revenue-raising tools 
because they rely on addicts whose inelastic demand is resistant to price increas-
es, but it appears now as though it is legislators who are addicted to the idea of 
using sin taxes. 
FRANKLIN LIU 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See Hoffer, supra note 56, at 33 (noting that in addition to taxes on cigarettes, bans on ciga-
rette advertising and warning label requirements have been used to curb cigarette smoking). 
 180 Id. at 4 (distinguishing sin taxes, which are a form of hard paternalism from soft paternalism 
which involves providing consumers with better information about available alternatives). 
  
 
